DISTRIBUTION OF COPYRIGHT ON AI-GENERATED CONTENT: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA AND THE EU APPROACHES

ABSTRACT

The article explores one of the most pressing issues in modern intellectual property law (IP law), whether content created using artificial intelligence (AI) is protected by it  or not. The article analyzes the positions of Russian researchers, court practices, and provides a comparative analysis of legal approaches in the Russian Federation and the European Union (EU). In conclusion, the author identifies common trends and specific features of each legal system and formulates conclusions about possible future developments.

АННОТАЦИЯ

В статье исследуется одна из наиболее актуальных проблем современного интеллектуального права -  защищается ли контент созданный с использованием искуственного интелекта (ИИ) или нет. В статье анализируется позиция российских исследователей, судебной практики и проводится сравнительный анализ правовых подходов в Российской Федерации и Европейского союза (ЕС). В заключение, после изучения, автор выявляет общие тенденции и специфику каждого из правопорядков, формулируются выводы о возможных путях дальнейшего развития.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, copyright, author's dilemma, AI user, algorithm developer, comparative legal analysis, Russian law, EU law.

Ключевые слова: искусственный интеллект, авторское право, дилемма автора, пользователь ИИ, разработчик алгоритма, сравнительно-правовой анализ, право России, ЕС.

The rapid development and integration of artificial intelligence technologies, particularly generative models, into creative industries from visual arts and music to literature and film has presented legal systems worldwide with a set of extremely complex challenges. The lack of clear regulation on this matter only intensifies the debate surrounding it. The classical copyright paradigm, shaped over centuries and based on the principle of the author as a natural person a principle reflected in most copyright laws is now facing a new test of time. Today, Artificial Intelligence (hereinafter, AI) is so advanced and has become such a commonplace part of people's lives that its use is permeating the world of art and film. Consequently, new questions are emerging, and one of the most pressing at the moment, in the author's opinion, is whether copyright extends to materials created by AI. This article examines the legislation and doctrinal approaches to this issue in Russia, as well as provides a comparison with the EU approach, given that the Russian debate largely revolves around Article 1228 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation. This article stipulates that the author of a result of intellectual activity is the citizen whose creative labor produced it [5]. A number of researchers insist on a literal interpretation of this provision, arguing that AI is merely a tool, and the author should be recognized as the user who performed the creative selection and set the task (for example, by formulating the text prompt for the AI) [8]. Others point to the need to analyze the entire value creation chain and propose considering the possibility of recognizing co-authorship or introducing a new legal regime [7, p.5-22]. The absence of clear legislative regulation has led to the formation of legal positions occurring largely through court rulings. A key case in this regard is Case No. А40-200471/2023 [6]. This is one of the first cases in Russia where a court directly confronted the issue of protecting rights to an object created using AI technology (a deepfake in this case). The claimant, LLC " Рефейс технолоджис " held exclusive rights to a video created on its commission by a creative group that used a deepfake to generate an image of actor Keanu Reeves. The respondent used this video without permission, arguing that a work created by AI is not subject to copyright and attempted to challenge the application of copyright to this image. The Russian court's decision proved to be landmark. The courts of three instances rejected the respondent's arguments and upheld the claim, awarding compensation from the respondent. In response to the respondent's arguments that the deepfake video was not a product of human creativity and therefore could not be protected by copyright, the Moscow Arbitration Court, and subsequently the Ninth Arbitration Court of Appeal, formed a unified and fundamentally important position. The courts stated that the neural network was merely an "additional processing tool" analogous to complex graphic editing software. They recognized the key factor as being the personal creative contribution of the group of authors: the screenwriter, cinematographer, and motion designer, who controlled this technology. Their joint work, expressed in the original script, filming, and editing, gave rise to an audiovisual work protected by copyright.

This decision establishes the "instrumental approach" to AI technologies in practice. AI is viewed not as a co-author or an independent creator, but as a complex digital tool in human hands. The copyrightability of a work depends not on the fact of using a neural network, but on the demonstrable creative contribution of a human at the stages of conception, task-setting (prompting), and final selection of the result. Thus, this case sets an important practical criterion: if content creation requires creative decisions, skills, and control over the process from a human, copyright will protect the final object. This provides a degree of legal certainty for creators and companies already actively using AI in the production of video, images, and music, but simultaneously places on them the burden of proving their creative involvement.

Nevertheless, while this issue remains debatable in Russia, other jurisdictions also have problems addressing this problem. Let us examine how EU law addresses this question. An analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union reveals decisions that define originality. A central element of the EU legal framework is the requirement for originality as an "author's own intellectual creation" first clearly articulated in the CJEU judgment in Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening (C-5/08, 2009). Here, the Court ruled that a work is protected by copyright only if it is the result of the author's intellectual creation, expressing their creative choices. This decision harmonized the standard of originality across the EU, emphasizing that protection does not require artistic merit or novelty, but necessarily involves a personal stamp [4, para. 45]. Subsequently, in Eva-Maria Painer v Standard VerlagsGmbH (C-145/10, 2011), the CJEU clarified that originality manifests through the free and creative choices made by the author during the creation stages, such as the choice of composition, lighting, or angle for photographs, reflecting their personality [3, paras. 88 94, 99]. The Court rejected the notion that certain types of works (e.g., portrait photographs) merit lesser protection due to allegedly limited creativity, reaffirming the approach that creativity is linked to the human mind and will.

These precedents highlight the dilemma in the world of AI, where content is generated based on statistical patterns rather than conscious choices; the absence of a human author leaves the work unprotected. Thus, European copyright law requires human authorship for protection. Consequently, purely AI-generated content will not be protected due to the lack of human contribution. Without evidence of a unique human creative contribution, content is not original and does not qualify for copyright protection. However, content created with the aid of AI can still be protected by copyright if a human has made a creative contribution to its creation and exercised significant control (e.g., through editing, curation, complex prompting). But again, simply inputting a basic prompt is insufficient; a "personal stamp" from a human is necessary.

An analysis of the legislation and case law approaches in Russia and the European Union regarding the determination of authorship for works created using artificial intelligence reveals both fundamental similarities in core principles and significant differences in their implementation. The common ground is the adherence to the principle that, in both Russia and the EU, copyright extends only to the results of activity created by a human, and only a human can be recognized as an author. Therefore, completely autonomously generated AI content, devoid of meaningful human input, is denied protection in both jurisdictions. However, the similarities end here, and fundamental differences in problem-solving methods begin. At the current stage, Russia has chosen the path of adapting existing legislation through case law. Case No. А40-200471/2023 became a landmark precedent where the court, recognizing AI as an "additional processing tool" effectively extended and applied the classical norm on creative labor to the new reality. In contrast, the EU is moving along the path of comprehensive, pre-emptive regulation. The EU is developing new laws to prevent disputes and introducing special norms for example, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689, also known as the AI Act which oblige developers to ensure transparency in data use and compliance with copyrights, creating stricter frameworks for the entire ecosystem [2]. Despite the differences, both legal systems face a common challenge. Having decided in both jurisdictions that copyright protection requires significant human participation in the creation of a work, the criterion for determining the extent of this human involvement remains unclear. What volume and nature of human intervention (e.g. complexity of the prompt, number of editing iterations, final selection) is sufficient to recognize a creative contribution? This question remains a "gray area" in both Russia and the EU, creating risks for legal certainty. The comparison shows that the dilemma of authorship in the age of AI cannot be solved by simple denial or the literal application of old norms. Russia, relying on the flexibility of its legal system and judicial practice, and the EU, building a comprehensive regulatory architecture, will both see their frameworks continuously tested by technological evolution. The most likely development vector in the medium term is not a radical revision of copyright fundamentals, but a further detailing of criteria and procedures, possibly through official clarifications or legislative amendments.

List of literature:

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