CULTURE OR RELIGION?: AN ANALYSIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVES OF KARL MANNHEIM AND EMILE DURKHEIM

ABSTRACT

This study explores the position of myth, ritual, and tradition within the sociology of religion and the sociology of culture, drawing on the perspectives of Emile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim. The paper consists of an introduction, two main sections, and a conclusion. The introduction defines the key concepts - myth, ritual, and tradition - and outlines the scope of both sociological fields. The first section examines how Durkheim conceptualizes culture and religion through these terms, emphasizing their role in social cohesion and collective consciousness. The second section analyzes Mannheim’s interpretation of the same concepts, particularly their relationship to ideology, knowledge, and cultural dynamics. The conclusion synthesizes the shared insights derived from the arguments of both sociologists and evaluates their theoretical intersections. Based on these findings, the study ultimately addresses the guiding question: Should these phenomena be approached primarily through the sociology of religion or the sociology of culture?

АННОТАЦИЯ

В настоящем исследовании рассматривается положение мифа, ритуала и традиции в рамках социологии религии и социологии культуры на основе социологических концепций двух выдающихся мыслителей - Эмиля Дюркгейма и Карла Манхейма. Статья включает введение, два основных раздела и заключение.Во введении формулируются базовые определения, отвечающие на вопросы: «Что такое миф?», «Что такое ритуал?», «Что такое традиция?», а также очерчиваются границы социологии религии и социологии культуры. Первый основной раздел посвящён анализу места культуры и религии в социологической системе Дюркгейма через рассмотрение понятий, определённых во введении. Во втором разделе исследуется интерпретация этих категорий в контексте культуры и религии с позиции социологического подхода Манхейма. В заключительной части выявляются общие выводы, к которым приходят Дюркгейм и Манхейм, сопоставляя свои аргументы. На основании представленных рассуждений также предпринимается попытка ответить на вопрос: «Социология религии или социология культуры?»

Keywords: Myth, Ritual, Tradition, Sociology of Culture, Sociology of Religion, Emile Durkheim, Karl Mannheim

Ключевые слова: Миф, Ритуал, Традиция, Социология Культуры, Социология Религии, Эмиль Дюркгейм, Карл Манхайм

Introduction

It is undeniable that religion and culture have been present and have played a significant role in human lives throughout the entire span of time that humankind has existed and learned to coexist. The initiation of sociology as a science is often traced back to Ancient Greece with the Sophists. However, to claim that sociology did not exist prior to this era would merely prevent us from progressing beyond a visionary approach. This suggests that, concurrently with the coexistence of humanity as a society, culture and religion have found a position to sustain themselves. From a sociological perspective, culture and religion are separated into distinct fields. Nevertheless, the combination of myth, ritual, and tradition allows us to recognize common perspectives and grants us the courage to bring these concepts together.

When examining the term Myth, its most comprehensive definition allows it to be characterized as religious narratives^[1] Mithic narratives have established their place in the oral tradition of every society, incorporating the cultural elements, symbols, and values of the respective community. Furthermore, they have consistently found a source from which to draw sustenance on a religious level. It can be argued that attempting to isolate myth from the sacred amounts to nothing more than emptying it of its intrinsic meaning. As Karen Armstrong emphasizes, the fact that the myth-based way of thinking is often viewed unfavorably in contemporary society cannot be denied, frequently being perceived as hedonistic indulgence or irrational acquiescence[1, p. 8]. This particular viewpoint has historically been directed toward myth. However, scholarly works on myth over time have demonstrated that this perspective is flawed and inadequate for fully defining the concept. Lord Raglan addresses this point by contending that because myths are sacred narratives, they must be positioned distinctly from mere imagination. Consequently, they are resistant to alteration and transformation, and their creation or modification cannot be undertaken by just anyone [2, p. 190]. The concept of imagination referred to by Raglan here must be understood differently from the contemporary usage of the term. The tradition inherent in mythic narratives speaks of the imagination of a superior intellect, an imaginative capacity that is difficult for the average individual to attain.

It is appropriate to consider myths as the principal representations of narrative tradition. However, the definition that attributes supernatural characteristics to them necessitates approaching the study of myth from varied critical standpoints. Although a religious foundation exists, this does not conclusively imply that myth is wholly identical to religion. The fact that myth is transmitted via the cultural narrative heritage of faith, coupled with the potential for reinterpretation by individual narrators in oral culture and variations caused by changes in the setting of its performance, collectively demonstrates the living and dynamic nature of myth. This raises a crucial question: Why is it so challenging to modify a myth that maintains such vitality? The most encompassing answer is undoubtedly rooted in the fact that these are sacred narratives, widely regarded by the societies from which they originate as the utterance of the divine within their theological framework.

Rituals can be defined as practical forms of enactment. They represent the embodied expressions of a society’s cultural elements, values, and symbols. When examining their origins, it is possible to trace rituals back to periods long before recorded human history. At the roots of ritual behavior, the human capacity and inclination for imitation becomes evident. For instance, with Johan Huizinga’s introduction of the concept homo ludens, the relationship between ritual and play also becomes observable. Huizinga, through the term homo ludens—“the playing human”—argues that humans learn and perform certain gestures and actions by imitating animals [3, p. 16–17]. The resemblance between ritual and play also manifests itself in the feeling of belonging, that is, in the sense of being part of a community. Rituals constitute practice patterns to which societies are deeply attached and which are difficult to change. When members of a society fail to perform a ritual or perform it incompletely, they often believe that misfortune will occur or they experience a sense of discomfort or guilt. This indicates that rituals occupy a crucial position in fostering a sense of belonging within the community. The feeling of being part of a group—of belonging to them and acting like them—instills a form of psychological security in individuals.

Rituals are not merely random collections of practices. We observe that every action performed, every word spoken, and every behavior enacted serves a significant purpose. In contemporary society, it is possible to include rites, ceremonies, festivals, and rites of passage within the concept of the ritual. Sibel Özbudun discusses the similarities and functions of state ceremonies and transition rites with respect to the concept of the rite [4]. She argues that the celebration of ceremonies is crucial for the state to confer a sense of existence and belonging. Is it a coincidence that the phenomenon we refer to as a rite in primal societies presents itself as a ceremony in modern society?

According to Eliade, every space consecrated through a rite corresponds to the Center of the World, and the time of every ritual corresponds to the time of the mythical beginning[5, p. 33]. Viewed from this perspective, the correlation of rituals with ceremonies allows us to see them as a reflection of the archaic and deep-seated belonging of a given society.

The existence of a connection between myth and ritual is too evident to be disregarded. Just as we can take myths as narratives, it is possible to view rituals as the enacted forms of these mythical narratives. Rituals also serve, in a way, the function of validating and sustaining the myth. The question posed by Lord Raglan—whether myth originated from ritual or ritual from myth [2, p. 189]—receives different answers from every theoretician, yet the strength of the bond between the two undeniably demonstrates its existence. Simultaneously, Raglan emphasizes that a myth requires a ritual to sustain its continuity, and a ritual requires a myth to sustain its own continuity [2, p. 193]. According to Hooke, the ritual associated with myth eventually transforms into something that fulfills the needs of people over time [6, p. 98]. Rituals have mythical models among their principles, and they manifest as the practical implementation of mythical mythos[5, p. 36].

The concept of tradition practically emerges as continuation practices in societies where the myth finds its place verbally, and the ritual, originating from the myth, is put into practice^[2]. The process of sustaining and transmitting the myth that has been ritualized is called tradition. It is observed that the degree to which a tradition is considered a tradition is differentiated within the context of questions such as whether it has been invented^[3] or performed. Should a practice that is not performed be included in tradition? What is the role of society in the performance of tradition? In this context, what is the position of culture and religion? These questions will be addressed in subsequent sections.

Tradition instills a sense of belonging within the community. Is it not a shared sentiment that constitutes the essence of a society? If the answer is yes, then tradition is precisely the mechanism that enables this shared sentiment. To view tradition solely as the transmission of rituals associated with events such as weddings, births, or funerals is to misunderstand its full scope. Tradition encompasses everything that is passed down from one generation to the next. It manifests itself not only in broad domains such as culture and religion, but also in the practices transmitted within smaller communities.

For example, in some workplaces, the acceptance of a newly employed individual by the existing staff may be ensured through a symbolic ritual, and the repetition of this ritual for every new employee can be regarded as an illustration of myth, ritual, and tradition. As the example suggests, an unwritten rule, its enactment, and the transmission of this enactment to newly hired individuals constitute a process through which these concepts are sustained. The intention here is to illustrate the connection and distinctions among myth, ritual, and tradition.

The most significant aspect of tradition is its ability to find a social environment in which it can continue to exist. Tradition remains “alive” insofar as it persists within the community. For tradition to sustain itself, it must be transmitted to future generations. Owing to this “living” quality, tradition is also subject to change. This process of change may manifest clearly or subtly across generations. Societies often perceive traditions as ancient structures. Because of this perception of antiquity, traditions have endured to the present day. At the same time, the ancient nature of tradition renders it resistant to modification or renewal. The difficulty of altering tradition may result in society’s inability to adapt to new practices, leading either to the disappearance of those practices or to their failure to gain acceptance.

Culture encompasses everything shaped by human intervention. The determining point of culture is the human. The determining point in the process of culture's formation occurs as long as the human manifests itself in nature. . Humans and societies are composed of complex structural units. Sociology of Culture is the name given to the branch of science that examines the field of culture's sociology. The sociology of culture delves into the processes of cultural production, the organization of production, and who and in what manner participates in this field. It is a field that focuses on the processes of cultural production, including the authorities that determine whether a cultural product is valuable due to its production, distribution, or popularization. Cultural sociology, on the other hand, focuses more on culture and the cultural object itself. In the sociology of culture, the Hegelian stance is manifest in the ontological, while the Kantian^[4] stance is manifest in the epistemological [7].

Religion can be described as a set of beliefs. Religion can be seen as the totality of demands that a society's or person's believed deity has, and the individual's or society's act of putting these into practice. Sociology of religion, similar to the sociology of culture, emerges as a young branch of science.Gustav Mensching points out that two things are implied by the sociology of religion. The first of these is that in the 19th century, religion was attempted to be explained based on social conditions. This led to religion being perceived as totemism and interpreted in this manner^[5]. The second understanding is the approach to the sociology of religion encountered today. What is meant by this understanding is the view that sociological events within the structure of religion and the sociological relations of religion should be examined [8, p. 19-21]. Gustav's articulation of the development process is quite valuable for us to observe the evolution of the sociology of religion. The sociology of religion is quite important in terms of its connection to methodology. Thus, it paves the way for those who wish to work in these fields to put their work into practice with a specific methodology.

From Emile Durkheim’s Perspective

Emile Durkheim^[6] (1858–1917) is one of the important classical sociology theorists due to his contributions to sociology. He endeavored to establish sociology as an independent discipline and afforded it a scientific status. Durkheim is known as a French sociologist. To understand and properly analyze sociologists, it is important to comprehend the geography they lived in and the society they were born into. This section will not provide a general overview of Durkheim's sociology. The focus will be on Durkheim's thoughts on religion and where we can position them from a sociological perspective, particularly concerning myth, ritual, and tradition.

To understand Durkheim, one must first comprehend his views on morality and religion. His conceptualizations of religion and morality rest upon significant explanatory principles. In his sociology of religion, Durkheim traces the origins of what he considers “elementary” or “primitive” religion. He seeks to answer the question: What is the source of primordial religion? According to Cevat Özyurt, the content and principles of religion within Durkheim’s sociology may vary in accordance with historical conditions and the structure of society [9, p. 156]. Özyurt also notes that Durkheim grounds his sociology on the view that social facts, by their very nature, are also moral facts. Durkheim emphasizes that the moral order upon which social integration depends is determined by the conditions of society [10, p. 96].

Like many anthropologists, Durkheim turns to Aboriginal societies to develop his arguments, particularly in relation to religion. He challenges J. Frazer’s claim that early societies neither possessed a concept of god nor maintained an institution that could be called religion—an argument Durkheim ultimately refutes. Durkheim concludes: “However much humanity may have transformed itself, it has remained, philosophically speaking, at the same level of consciousness; for this reason it has always believed in some deity and performed religious rites, even if such practices appear strange to us today”[11, p. 17]. Durkheim thus argues that despite social evolution and transformation, humanity’s fundamental religious perceptions remain comparable to their earliest forms. For him, religion retains an elemental structure rooted in its primordial origins.

Durkheim’s major reflections on religion appear in his work The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Parsons contends that Durkheim underwent a theoretical shift between his earlier work on suicide and his later work on religion. According to Parsons, early Durkheim approached social inquiry as a positivist applying the methods of the natural sciences to society, whereas later Durkheim adopted an idealist perspective, locating the source of social change in transformations of collective ideas [12, p. 97–98].

According to Durkheim, primitive religions not only reveal the fundamental elements of religion but also make it easier to explain the religious phenomenon. Confident that anthropological discoveries have illuminated this domain, Durkheim argues that earlier understandings of religion have been effectively overturned [13, p. 243]. He rejects Reville’s conception of divinity within religion and agrees with Tylor that in tribes where the concept of spirit is absent, it should not be artificially imposed from outside. Furthermore, he accepts Burnouf’s and Oldenberg’s view that Buddhism lacks a notion of deity. Durkheim’s conception of the divine consequently leads him to refrain from considering Buddha a true god [14, p. 67–68].

To understand Durkheim’s perspective on the rituals found in religion, we observe that, alongside Frazer, he was of the opinion that sacrifice is independent of religion. However, the view that it should not be defined entirely separate from religion also persists [15, p. 81]. Similarly, Durkheim does not limit religion solely to God.

Durkheim maintains that “the religious phenomenon is best defined and explained by starting from the elements that constitute it. It is possible to divide the religious phenomenon into two fundamental categories: (a) beliefs (croyances) and (b) religious rituals (rites). Beliefs are certain mental states, whereas religious rites are particular forms of conduct. What distinguishes religious rites from other forms of action is that they originate from belief” [14, p. 68]. As this formulation suggests, Durkheim conceives religion as a composite whole. His definition of beliefs as mental states reflects his understanding of myth, and his characterization of specific forms of action reflects his understanding of ritual.

Durkheim further argues: In order to make an individual willingly submit to this constraint, no artificial mechanism is needed; it is sufficient to make him conscious of his natural dependence and inferior position. Through religion he may emotionally or symbolically conceive of this constraint, or through science he may form a proper and definite concept of it [16].

 What Durkheim is conveying above is the ease with which religion finds believers without the need for a coercive motive. In this, it shows similarity with myth. In myths, people do not strive to make others believe; they simply emerge in a way that is believed.

Durkheim looks at religion not only through the dimensions of rituals and beliefs but also in relation to culture. Furthermore, he states that the underlying practices of subjects considered to be individual phenomena, such as suicide^[7], originate from social, moral, religious, and cultural institutions. As can be understood here, Durkheim's fundamental subject in sociology enables us to see that he developed a society-focused sociological understanding rather than an individual-focused one.

Swingewood states that Durkheim emphasized that the suicide rate in a society is normal, but when suicides are examined, a pathological cause should be sought, especially in European contexts, as the normal suicide rate was exceeded [17, p. 292]. Furthermore, Durkheim views it as a problem that society accepts suicide as normal and does nothing about it. He suggests that if certain social punishments were administered to those who commit suicide, a reduction in the situation could be mentioned. For example, he emphasizes that punishments such as not holding funeral ceremonies or not erecting a tombstone could be administered [18, p. 426].
Durkheim proposed the most influential early sociological view on rites by linking them to religious practices, which he believed divided the world into two classes: the sacred and the profane. According to him, rites were "rules of conduct that determine how a person should behave in the presence of sacred objects" [4, p. 20]. Interest in rites and ceremonies increased again in the 1980s. Durkheim emerges as one of the sociologists who addressed this.

'Durkheim, in Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse^[8] published in 1915, proposed the most influential early sociological view on rites by relating them to religious practices, which he believed divided the world into two classes: the sacred and the profane. According to Durkheim, rites are rules of conduct that determine how a person should behave in the presence of sacred objects. However, since the "sacred" in Durkheim is, in reality, the self-exaltation and self-worship of society, rites establish people's emotionally charged interdependencies and social arrangements. Rites, in a way, symbolize the system of socially sanctioned "appropriate" relationships between individuals and groups. With these functions, they play a dominant role in Durkheim's theory of social solidarity' [4, p. 22].

As conveyed by Sibel Özbudun, Durkheim emphasizes the importance of rites as practices in approaching the sacred. As was stressed in the introduction, the sentiment an individual feels toward the rituals performed in that society determines the individual's position in that society. Thus, it can transmit the feeling of belonging, that they are a part of that society, to new generations. As Sibel Özbudun mentioned above, rites, as rituals, have great effects on society. With these structures, they complete Durkheim's sociological views. According to Durkheim, if the division of labor is done correctly in society, the society can easily incorporate individuals into its structures and become a whole.

'Durkheim briefly asserts that the fundamental function of religion is to strengthen the conception of society created in the minds of individual people through religious worship performed collectively, and that without a myth related to the deity, worship, laws, and beliefs, a society would not have a conception of itself, and consequently, such a society moving away from religiosity would die' [11, p. 42].

As can be understood from this paragraph, he speaks of religion's function to keep society together. Simultaneously, this coming together also provides an environment for the society to sustain itself. Durkheim is essentially speaking here of intergenerational interaction. The continuation of society also means its handover to the subsequent generation and its reception from the preceding generations.

It is clearly seen that Durkheim compressed the phenomenon of God, which he expected to see in the Stone Age stage, into initiation rituals. These rituals should be considered as a genuine dimension of worship with the rituals applied to a supreme God [11, p. 18]. According to Durkheim, three more conditions are necessary for the development of religion. First, the development of a set of religious beliefs is necessary. These beliefs are representations that express the nature of sacred things and the relationships they maintain either with each other or with profane things. Second, a set of religious rituals is necessary. These are rules of conduct that regulate how a person should act in the presence of these sacred objects. Finally, a religion requires a church or an inclusive moral community [12, p. 99]. Durkheim actually points out at this juncture that people gathered for a certain purpose and forming a community have more energy and potential than the potential they possess alone [11, p. 36]. He speaks of the individual's ability to establish a bond of belonging under the heading of religion and to demonstrate their existence as a part of society.

Weber emerges as one of the important sociologists in terms of the sociology of culture. However, it is possible to mention the differences between Emile Durkheim and Max Weber in terms of the sociology of culture. According to Weber, the cultural sciences embrace all disciplines that are concerned with human behavior, its meaning, and its truths [19, p. 220]. The point where Emile Durkheim and Max Weber diverge on the subject of culture emerges in the dimension of belief. For Weber, belief or culture, in the simplest term, is separated from science or knowledge [19, p. 221]. As can be understood from the emphasis on belief or culture here, it is possible to speak of a unity between the two. Small, subtle points must be addressed to distinguish the two concepts. Our religious beliefs are also motivated by the cultural values of the community we live in.

Durkheim, unlike Weber, is concerned with the effects that ideas might produce, stemming from how they can cause effects. Durkheim sees beliefs as a valid field for sociology when they result in social facts. Durkheim does not possess an understanding of a social system or society similar to Weber [19, p. 222].

To fully understand Durkheim's concept of culture, we need to delve a little deeper into his sociology. This is because Durkheim does not make a clear distinction regarding the sociology of culture in his works. We understand his concept of the sociology of culture today by delving into the depths of his works. Köksal Alver notes that Durkheim was in pursuit of the cultural and that all his theoretical interests were surrounded by this curiosity. Durkheim is also known to have the idea of establishing a logical and functional connection between culture and society [20, p. 202]. Turner defines this issue as Durkheim being liminal (on the threshold)[21, p. 176]. Here, Durkheim attempts to explain belonging or not belonging to a community with the metaphor of the threshold. 'The state of liminality, marginality, and structural inferiority is frequently resorted to as myths, symbols, rituals, philosophical systems, and works of art are created' [21, p. 182].

Kırk produces theories regarding Durkheim’s myth theory, stating that myths re-establish normal life in a libertarian manner [22, p. 155]. Cohan, on the other hand, states that according to Durkheim, myths are part of the religious system and articulate in words what rituals convey through actions. Both myth and ritual have functions such as exalting and securing unity and solidarity. Durkheim also places myths in a different category in terms of their representation of value judgments in social life. Durkheim emphasizes that he is of the view that myth, along with other religious beliefs, forms the basis of cultural values by categorizing the world [23, p. 167]. Furthermore, according to Durkheim, mythical symbols are seen as an archive and a record [23, p.172].

In this section of our study, Durkheim's perspective within the context of myth, ritual, religion, culture, and tradition has been examined. To understand Durkheim well, it must be clearly underlined that he was a sociologist. Durkheim attempted to explain all these concepts within a sociological, religious, and cultural perspective framework. It is also seen that he displayed anthropological approaches in these explanations.

From Karl Mannheim’s Perspective

Karl Mannheim (1893 – 1947)^[9] was a German-Hungarian sociologist who placed great emphasis on the cultural sciences. His sociological approach did not simply rest on utilizing and adapting the methods of the natural sciences. According to Karl Mannheim, one of the main factors of sociology is the use of cultural sciences. Human beings are born into a cultural society and environment. Viewing humanity through the lens of the natural sciences alone, while disregarding the environment, society, and the individual in which a person is born, can lead to a partial understanding and interpretation^[10]. It must be considered that the object living in nature is human and that the primary area of investigation is the nature in which humans live. Humans do not remain uniform like objects in nature. They change and are constantly transforming themselves. Therefore, our social-scientific perspective must be aligned with the constantly changing structure of human nature.

In Mannheim's sociology, the influence of Dilthey’s distinction between natural sciences and human sciences is discernible. Dilthey states that the natural sciences adopt an approach geared towards explanation (Erklären), while the human sciences adopt an approach geared towards understanding (Verstehen) [24, p. 13].When conducting the Sociology of Knowledge, Mannheim differentiates between epistemology and gnoseology^[11] and emphasizes that the Sociology of Knowledge adopts a gnoseological stance. Gnoseology is known as the philosophical theory of knowledge [24, p. 18]. Zygmunt Bauman suggests that Mannheim's approach to conservative thought, utopias, romanticism, and science represents hermeneutic approaches aimed at understanding their meaning and significance as cultural objects[25, p. 187-188]. According to Mannheim, knowledge is determined by social existence, and he broadens this perspective by linking ideas to the diversity of different positions within society[12, p. 214]. Ritzer provides the differences between generations as an example in this context.

According to Mannheim, the concept of Utopia is the will to change; in this respect, utopian thought constitutes a significant force in historical transformation. Utopian desires are linked to the pursuit of transcending existing social roles and, when necessary, stepping outside of them. The utopian desire stands outside of ourselves [25, p. 197]. Without utopian hope, people become alienated from human nature: they become object-like. Without ideals, people become subject to their animal instincts[25, p. 199].

Data concerning the psychic origins of many cultures have been presented. However, as a result of this, the fundamental question regarding the spirit's (Geist) relationship with reality has been neglected [26, p. 48]. Due to the functionalization and mechanization of psychic phenomena, the integrity of the spirit^[12] and personality has been lost.Mannheim notes that the concept of psychic formation is a temporal development and that a dual limitation exists within the cultural sciences, and he suggests that this limitation threatens culture. According to him, psychic concepts restrict culture[26, p. 51]. Mannheim speaks of progress in the present day, stating that we have advanced enough to observe the different intellectual structures of cultural environments [26, p. 108].

“Karl Mannheim articulated this point explicitly with the term “Psychic formation”, which refers to the systematic ordering of an individual’s personal impulses, desires, lifestyle, and modes of thinking according to the ‘rules and regulations of the organization’ when that individual lives within a limited part of a large rational organization. For this reason, rational organizations become alienating structures: the ‘guiding’ principles that shape a person’s actions, thoughts, and even emotions no longer find their source in the individual conscience, as in the people of the Reformation era, nor in the independent power and capacity for thought of the Cartesian individual” [27, p. 279].

At this point, he draws attention to the impulses through which individuals, who are subject to a particular structure within society, regulate and control themselves. Mannheim’s notion of self-rationalization can also be understood as a concept introduced to highlight the position of the individual within the organization.

Regarding the transmission of culture, Alfred Weber^[13]argues that what he calls civilizational knowledge arises from the fact that worldviews cannot sufficiently penetrate volitional knowledge [26, p. 202]. According to Mannheim, norms are significant because they eliminate the treatment of cultural values as material objects, which was characteristic of the earlier mechanistic perspective [26, p. 51].

In his article “Religion as a Cultural System,” Geertz defined religion with the following organic concepts: Religion is a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in people by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic [28, p. 45]. With this perspective, it is possible to observe similarities between Karl Mannheim’s understanding of religion and that of Geertz.

Karl Mannheim’s approach to the sociology of culture is not as well known as his approach to the sociology of knowledge. In fact, in Mannheim’s sociology, these two domains reveal themselves to be interconnected. Due to his experience living in Germany, he examines the sociology of culture from a distinctly German perspective. He places important emphasis on the relationship between mind and culture [25, p. 208–209]. Mannheim avoids the reification and separation of the individual and society. Weber’s methodology of the social sciences plays a highly significant role in the development of Mannheim’s sociology of culture. While formulating a sociology of mind (culture)^[14], Mannheim strives to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism [25, p. 213].

Turner states that, in order to understand Mannheim’s sociology, one must recognize the German distinction between Zivilisation (civilization) and Kultur (culture)^[15]. Mannheim argues that the sociology of culture must go beyond an ethnography of customs linked merely to existing historical studies [25, p. 213].

Regarding the study of culture, Mannheim states that historical and social conditions shape thought. He argues that thought and knowledge are not independent of the social structure, nor do they simply emerge as reflections of it. Instead, he maintains that the structure of thought must be examined within a historical, sociological, and cultural totality, taking into account its processes of formation. In these discussions, since social actors become cultural objects as a result of socialization, Mannheim believes that general sociology can only investigate half of social reality. The sociology of culture, on the other hand, does not describe society as an abstract form but as a system of historical, lived, and potentially livable social events. Culture must continually recreate its own existence, given that ideology—and especially the social elements that extend from its material components—depends on this continuity. The task of the sociology of culture is therefore to understand and analyze cultural elements, social events, historical processes, and social functions that emerge from social processes. From this perspective, cultural elements are treated more as actions. Based on action, culture is formed—as in structural-functionalist theories—through its diffusion among social actors or through its increased use [29, p. 155].

Mannheim emphasizes the determinative role of historical and social conditions. Culture corresponds precisely to this definition. From the idea that knowledge is not independent of social structure, myth and ritual appear as products of social knowledge. It is also possible to speak of the existence of social knowledge in their transmission to future generations. Since culture must recreate itself in order to preserve its own existence, the traditional transmission of culture across generations also requires a process of continual re-creation. Thus, based on Mannheim’s view of cultural elements as forms of action, it would not be inaccurate to infer that he attributes significant importance to rituals.

“Intellectuals, although religion—albeit in its weakened form, as ritual and cult, in acts of thanksgiving and in ecstatic modes of experience—continued to survive, could easily fall into the mistaken belief that the Enlightenment radically transformed the masses; yet the influence of the Enlightenment was indeed strong enough to seriously undermine the religious image of the world. Modes of thinking characteristic of industrial society gradually penetrated fields that were connected, directly or indirectly, with industry, and over time, one after another, emptied the content of the components of the religious interpretation of the world” [26, p. 60].

Here, Mannheim refers to the relationship between the Enlightenment and religious thought. This dynamic persists in contemporary societies as well, showing similar characteristics within the domains of ritual, myth, and tradition. Today, the emphasis tends to be less on why, how, and for what purpose a tradition is performed, and more on whether or not it should be performed at all. In order to continue these traditions, their internal meanings are often hollowed out. When the emotional and romantic dimensions of practices such as tradition, myth, ritual, religion, and culture are emptied, their transmission across generations becomes disrupted.

Mannheim views myths as the ideologies of the new world. According to him, myths appear as tools used to nourish human beliefs. This can be seen in the example he provides from Mussolini’s speech in the footnote of Ideology and Utopia: “We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, a passion. It is not necessary that it be a reality”[30, p. 162].

To understand Mannheim’s sociology, it is also necessary to examine the concept of intelligentsia, a notion he uses in his sociology of culture. Mannheim discusses this concept in detail in the second chapter of his book Essays on the Sociology of Culture.

“The emergence of the intelligentsia marks the final stage in the development of social consciousness. Because its position within the social division of labor does not directly bind it to any particular form of social life, nor define it as one of the functioning parts of society, the intelligentsia is the group that arrives latest at a sociologically oriented perspective” [30, p. 133].

This is how Mannheim explains the concept. Turner, however, argues that in its most original form, the concept refers to an organized social group of educated individuals situated within a revolutionary context [25, p. 214]. With this concept, it would not be inaccurate to say that Mannheim attempts to construct a sociology of higher-status groups.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study has attempted to evaluate the sociological perspectives of Emile Durkheim and Karl Mannheim within the framework of myth, religion, culture, tradition, and ritual. The two sociologists adopt markedly different sociological approaches. What brings them together in this study are the key concepts outlined in the introduction.

According to Durkheim, understanding the sociology of culture requires examining and interpreting it through the sociology of religion. Myth, ritual, and tradition—which Durkheim approaches as elements of religion—fall within the domain of cultural studies today. Durkheim arrives at these concepts primarily by examining primitive societies. When viewed closely, the oral myths and their enacted forms—rituals—were performed vividly and regarded as sacred in primitive communities, leading Durkheim to explain them in religious terms.

For Mannheim, understanding the sociology of culture demands a deep engagement with the sociology of knowledge. Unlike Durkheim, Mannheim does not take a primitive perspective. Instead, he examines concepts that are shaped according to ideological and utopian frameworks of the modern world. He analyzes myth, ritual, and tradition from the perspective of contemporary societies. However, this approach is not romantic but rather adapted to ideological and utopian worldviews.

Finally, we attempt to answer the question: Is it religion or culture? The key to answering this question lies in the element of time. Durkheim’s categorization of these concepts under religion does not stem from a misunderstanding of culture. When the intellectual conditions of the 19th century are considered, Durkheim’s classification can be seen as appropriate for his time. Similarly, Mannheim’s framing of culture through concepts such as ideology and utopia does not imply a misunderstanding; his conceptualization corresponds to the characteristics of the 20th century in which he lived.

The perspectives of both sociologists on these concepts bear the imprint of their respective historical periods. While Mannheim adopts a predictive, future-oriented stance, Durkheim explains these phenomena by tracing them back to their “origins” in early societies.

Thus, providing a definitive and universally correct answer to the question “Religion or culture?” is not possible. Myth, ritual, and tradition find a place in every sphere of social life. Therefore, any answer to this question inevitably reflects the perspectives of authors and researchers, shaped by the intellectual influences of their own era.

References:

1. Armstrong, Karen. Mitlerin Kısa Tarihi (trans. Dilek Şendil). İstanbul: Merkez Kitapçılık Yayınları, 2005.
2. Raglan, Lord. ‘Mit ve Ritüel’ (trans. Evrim Ölçer Özüner). Halk Bilimi Kuramlar ve Yaklaşımlar II (ed. M. Öcal Oğuz ve diğerleri). Ankara: Geleneksel Yayınları, 2014.
3. Huizinga, Johan. Homo Ludens (trans. Mehmet Ali Kılıçbey). İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2015.
4. Özbudun, Sibel. Ayinden Törene. İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1997.
5. Eliade, Mircea. Edebi Dönüş Mitosu (trans. Ümit Altığ). Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994.
6. Segal, Robert A. Mit (trans. Nursu Örge). Ankara: Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004.
7. Zıjderveld, C. Anton. Kültür Sosyolojisi (trans. Kadir Canatan). İstanbul: Açılım Kitap Yayınları, 2013.
8. Mensching, Gustav. Din Sosyolojisi (trans. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Aydın). Konya: Literatürk Yayınları (Nüve Kültür Merkezi), 2012.
9. Özyurt, Cevat. ‘Hegel’in Din Yorumunun Sosyolojik Analizi: Dinin Tin ile İmtihanı’. Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi. vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 137–174, 2014.
10. Özyurt, Cevat. ‘Durkheim Sosyolojisinde Ahlaki Kontrol Sorunu’. Değerler Eğitimi Dergisi, vol. 5, no. 13, pp. 95–121, 2007.
11. Polatlar, Kaan. Durkheim’in Din Sosyolojisi. İstanbul: Yeni Alan Yayıncılık, 2019.
12. Ritzer, George ve Stepnisky, Jeffery. Sosyoloji Kuramları (trans. Himmet Hülür). Ankara: De Ki Basım Yayım, 2014.
13. Aron, Raymond. Sosyolojik Düşüncenin Evreleri (trans. Korkmaz Alemdar). Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 1994.
14. Turhan, Hasan. ‘Durkheim Sosyolojisi ve Durkheim’in Sosyolojik Düşünceye Katkıları’. Published Master’s Thesis. Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi, 2010.
15. Kılıç, A. Faruk. Türkiye’de Ahlak Felsefesinin Oluşumu. İstanbul: Dem Yayınları, 2007.
16. Durkheim, Emile. Dini Hayatın İlkel Biçimleri (trans. Fuat Aydın). İstanbul: Ataç Yayınları, 2005.
17. Swingewood, Alan. Sosyolojik Düşüncenin Kısa Tarihi (trans. Osman Akınbay). İstanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2010.
18. Durkheim, Emile. İntihar (trans. Z. Zühre İlkgelen). İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2013.
19. Schroeder, Ralph. Max Weber ve Kültür Sosyolojisi (trans. Mehmet Küçük). Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Yayınları, 1996.
20. Alver, Köksal. ‘Emile Durkheim ve Kültür Sosyolojisi’. Sosyoloji Dergisi. vol. 3, no. 21, pp. 199–210, 2010.
21. Turner, Victor. ‘Eşikte Olma Hali ve Cemaat’ (trans. Nuran Yavuz). Alexander, C. Jeffrey ve Seidman, Steven. Kültür ve Toplum Güncel Tartışmalar. İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2017.
22. Kırk, G. S. ‘Mitleri Tanımlamak Üzerine’ (trans. Kadriye Türkan). Halk Biliminde Kuramlar ve Yaklaşımlar II (ed. M. Öcal Oğuz ve diğerleri). Ankara: Geleneksel Yayınları, 2014.
23. Cohan, Percy S. ‘Mit Kuramları’ (trans. Evrim Ölçer Özünel). Halk Biliminde Kuramlar ve Yaklaşımlar II (ed. M. Öcal Oğuz ve diğerleri). Ankara: Geleneksel Yayınları, 2014.
24. Arslan, Hüsamettin. Bilgi Sosyoloji ve Karl Mannheim. Published Master’s Thesis. Bursa: Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2004.
25. Turner, Bryan S. Klasik Sosyoloji (trans. İdil Çetin). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014.
26. Mannheim, Karl. İdeoloji ve Ütopya (trans. Mehmet Okyayuz). Ankara: Epos Yayınları, 1995.
27. Mills, C. W. Toplumbilimsel Düşün (trans. Ünsal Oskay). İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2007.
28. Capps, Walter H. Toplum ve Din (trans. Ali Coşkun). Din, Toplum ve Kültür. İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005.
29. Çağırkan, Barış. ‘Kültür Sosyolojisinde Metodoloji Tartışmaları: İdeoloji Olarak Kültür ve Eylem Olarak Kültür’. SDÜ Fen – Edebiyat Fakültesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi. no. 42, pp. 147–160, 2017.
30. Mannheim, Karl. Kültür Sosyolojisi (trans. Mustafa Yalçınkaya). İstanbul: Pinhan Yayınları, 2017.