THE REVIVAL OF ISLAM IN UZBEKISTAN AFTER INDEPENDENCE: “ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES”

ABSTRACT

This article covers the advantages and disadvantages of Islam revival in Uzbekistan after the independence – and analyses the position of Islam in both periods (soviet and post-soviet periods). International relations theories as well the sociology of religion presume that religious identity in contemporary Uzbekistan cannot be exclusively seen as a local product; it is of a two-dimensional character and reflects both local and external influences. The article argues that while external dimensions are noteworthy, local developments and modernization need elaboration. The current position of the religious development cannot stand up to government.

The article assumes further discussion.

АННОТАЦИЯ

В данной статье рассматриваются преимущества и недостатки возрождения ислама в Узбекистане после обретения независимости, а также анализируется положение ислама в оба периода (советский и постсоветский периоды). Теории международных отношений, а также социология религии исходят из того, что религиозная идентичность в современном Узбекистане не может рассматриваться исключительно как локальный продукт; она носит двухмерный характер и отражает как местные, так и внешние воздействия. В статье утверждается, что, хотя внешние аспекты заслуживают внимания, локальные разработки и модернизация нуждаются в проработке. Нынешняя позиция религиозного развития не может противостоять правительству.

Статья предполагает дальнейшую дискуссию.

Keywords: Uzbekistan, Soviet Union, religion, Islam, Muslim, independent, international relations, history, philosophy, fundamentalism, Islamic movement.

Ключевые слова: Узбекистан, Советский Союз, религия, ислам, мусульманство, независимость, международные отношения, история, философия, фундаментализм, исламское движение.

INTRODUCTION

Islam, as a dynamic and global faith, has encountered continuous theological disputes among followers across its history in the region. Scholars within the Muslim community have used various labels to categorize their counterparts, reflecting differences in approach and interpretation. These differences have at times led to tensions, whether originating from spiritual leaders, advocates of reform, or those emphasizing strict adherence to foundational principles. Occasionally, even the state has been a subject of scrutiny. Nonetheless, the overarching theme remains the return of believers to the faith as it is intended to be practiced.

Since the end of the 1980s, the so-called Islamic Renaissance began to emerge in the Muslim regions of the USSR. Many of the secular and spiritual leaders spoke with slogans about returning to the values of Islam. Islam had become an integral part of society, so it turns out that Islam was becoming connected to the process of renewing society after a long silence, the period of Soviet power. Islam was a saving straw about which it was necessary to remind, and the masses of the people will not make them wait long for an answer for all these people.

Even in the Soviet period, a very large proportion of Central Asians considered themselves Muslims. At schools, they were taught atheism, but there was no more faith in this teaching than anything else taught in the USSR, including history, philosophy, economics, and scientific socialism. Many followed the age-old traditions of the Muslim community, such as circumcision, Muslim marriage and burial. Few people knew that these traditions are against the law, even professional atheist lecturers in the Muslim republics did not always know that circumcision, in the absence of medical evidence, was a violation of Soviet laws.

In addition, there was an even smaller number of righteous Muslims who had at least a limited traditional religious education; and since the mid-1940s, when Soviet power restored the spiritual administrations of Muslims [1], an extremely small group of Muslim theologians received education, traveled abroad, and at international conferences showed possession of religious subjects at the level of Muslim leaders from other countries of the world. They were the only source from which information about what was happening in the Muslim world as a whole reached the people living in the USSR.

Many argued that the reason for this reluctance was Islam, which was more widespread than previously thought. They said that Islam gives rise to narrow thinking, and as a result of which, under its “influence, they preferred not to learn Russian, served poorly in the army, and were potential traitors to the Soviet state [2].

Muslim rituals became part of a wider practice, but teaching people to faith was often entrusted to people who had limited official religious education. These worried theologians connected with SADUM (Central Asian Spiritual Administration of the Muslims) as much as the leadership in the Kremlin.

During this period, the new generation of theologians became famous, including Muhammad Sodik Muhammad Yusuf [3], who became the mufti of SADUM [4] in 1989. He received education in Khujre and in official Muslim schools and abroad, like his colleagues Said Abdullo Nuri [5] and Muhammadsharif Khimmatzoda [6] in Tajikistan and Sodikjon-Kori Kamalludin (Kamalov) [7] in Kyrgyzstan. All of them wanted to raise the level of religious education in Central Asia, and for this they were ready, at least at first, to work within the framework of Soviet institutions.

The materials of the revival of Islam in the countries of Central Asia is still little studied. There are few specialists who reasonably and competently separate Islam and terrorism, Wahhabism and fundamentalism. Therefore, it would be right, in my opinion, to turn to the reasons for entering the political arena of leaders with Islamic slogans. After all, Islam has always been in Uzbekistan and during the Soviet Union, although crushed at the level of tradition, but it was. I will try to answer what Islam has become in a difficult time of restructuring and the arrival of new leaders.

On the whole, the appeal of Islam and its revival during the period of restructuring and the creation of an independent state of Uzbekistan can be explained by internal reasons lying in the social, economic and spiritual spheres. It would be fundamentally wrong to assume that appeal of Islam is spontaneous and unexpected. And, A. Malashenko proposes that it is justifiable to assert that the increase in the Soviet Union can largely be attributed to the adverse characteristics of domestic socialism [8].

Marx and Engels envisioned a socialist society that was characterized by a materialistic and atheistic perspective. They viewed religion as a product of the socioeconomic conditions that perpetuated inequality and alienation. According to their ideology, as society progressed towards socialism and eventually communism, religion would naturally decline and lose its significance. This view is famously summarized in Marx's statement that "religion is the opium of the people," implying that it served as a form of social control and distraction from the real issues at hand [9].

So, the essential difference lies in the way that socialist regimes interpreted and acted upon the role of religion. The characteristic of religion as “opium” was published by Marx (in his Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right) just after the first Opium War, the terrible danger of opium was already known. Marx wrote about “the abolition of religion”. No wonder that some socialist regimes treated it as a direct threat to their ideological objectives, leading to attempts to curtail religious influence or eradicate it altogether. Another viewpoint on religion within socialist ideology is a creative rework and improvement of the works of Marx.

Since the 1980s, the process of the revival of Islam has been going on in Uzbekistan, and more widely followed the collapse of the USSR, especially in the early years of independence against the backdrop of weak state power. There was a competition between religious groups and secular authorities, but as the government gained strength and became more autocratic, it was able to more effectively direct the development of Islam. However, despite this, the state could not become the main factor determining the development of Islam, due to the sharp expansion of contacts with the external Muslim world.

After the collapse of the USSR and the proclamation of independence, the new government of Uzbekistan faced the question of the further course of development of the state. Uzbekistan was on the verge of choosing historical paths: to go to Turkey, which managed wisely to separate Islam and the state - to turn its face to world culture or to choose the path of Iran and Iraq, deceived by the horizons of special Muslim development, to plunge the people into the abyss of new hardships and trials [10]. Such reflections and forecasts were given by definite researchers in the early 1990s, when the term “Islam” was pronounced even more often on the territory of Uzbekistan and its closest neighbors than the words “restructuring” and “independence”.

The newly elected government was well aware of the traditional use of religion as a state policy for the Islamic East. It should be noted that at the first stage of development and formation of the states of Central Asia a certain Islamization of politics took place. There have also been significant changes in the policies of states towards religion, and more specifically, towards Islam. Presidents Islam Karimov and A. Akayev took the presidential oath on the Koran [11].

As one of the specialists in the region of Central Asia, A.V. Malashenko noticed, “It is not just about strengthening the ‘Islamic factor’, but above all about the new, unusual forms of manifestation of religious activity for the Soviet country” [12]. Then not only the Muslim clergy and leaders of political parties begin to talk about Islam, but also various newly formed political parties from the standpoint of Islamic renewal.

But whatever the beliefs and views of the participants in these groups, they all have one thing in common - they live and operate in a Muslim environment. And so, the appeal of Islam for these people is natural [13].

With the collapse of the USSR, Islam ceased to be the faith of a minority subjected to persecution by the religion, and became the religion of the majority of the population of the new independent states. Mentally used for many years to secretly perform religious rites, millions of Muslims felt free to follow the dictates of conscience, and the leaders of the new states had to decide how to take into account such sentiments so that they would not become a threat to their stay in power. Therefore, the issue of relations between Islam and the state throughout Central Asia is still acute as ever, and especially in Uzbekistan.

With the collapse of the USSR and the attainment of independence of Uzbekistan, processes of religious revival began to occur intensively in the republic.

With the disappearance of the Soviet ideology, the Muslims of the country were given greater opportunities to make pilgrimages (Hajj and Umrah) to Mecca and Medina, and during the years of independence hundreds of mosques and pilgrims and tombs were built and restored. From 1992 to 2018, the quota for pilgrimage increased more than 10 times.

Freedom of religion, equality of all religious denominations and the secular nature of the state are enshrined in the Constitution of Uzbekistan and the Law on “Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations”. In the republic there are restrictions and prohibitions on the conversion of believers of some confessions into other ones, missionary activities and the creation of political parties of a religious nature.              

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION

Religious organizations of Uzbekistan are obliged to undergo compulsory registration with the Ministry of Justice in coordination with the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers. The Ministry of Justice is also entitled to terminate the activities of a religious organization by force. Currently, according to the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Cabinet of Ministers, there are 2064 Muslim religious organizations in the country — mosques and madrasas.

Currently, there are three higher Islamic educational institutions in the republic: The Tashkent Islamic Institute named after Imam Bukhari (Tashkent), the Tashkent Islamic University (Tashkent), Miri Arab Higher Madrasa (Bukhara). Also, in the country there are 9 secondary specialized Islamic educational institutions - madrasas. The oldest Islamic higher education institution is Miri Arab Higher Madrasa, which was founded in Bukhara in the 16th century.

During the years of independence, especially in the 90s, during the period of religious revival in the country, Uzbekistan has repeatedly experienced the challenges of Islamic extremism and religiously motivated terrorism. Examples of this are the appearance in the early and mid-1990s of the first extremist groups in Namangan, Andijan and other cities of the Fergana region; terrorist attacks on the Cabinet of Ministers and other buildings of other government institutions in the capital of Uzbekistan in February 1999; the invasion of militants of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)* of the territory of Uzbekistan (Surkhandarya and Tashkent regions) in August 2000 and a number of other cases.

After the disappearance of the ideology of communist internationalism and the corresponding national policy, which at least coordinated the interests of certain ethnic groups in the former USSR, the ethnically Muslims of society turned out to be without this important social regulator. In this situation, the ideology of Islam, which does not divide people according to ethnic and racial affiliation, acted as a unifying and consolidating force in the Muslim republics of Central Asia. Thus, Islam began to act as a tool for regulating relations between nations and entire countries. Although Islam is not yet performing a consolidating function in the region and is not a factor in state-building, politicians and those who want to become politicians have already tried and are trying to use it (for example, the leaders of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*.

Having no chance to participate on its own terms in an open political struggle for power, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan* chose the extreme measure of political struggle - terrorism. In order to understand this tactic, we need to look into the recent past. At the dawn of its formation, the authorities of Uzbekistan actively supported the process of Islamization of the population. The authorities supported the opening of mosques and religious enlightenment of the people; in Fergana part of Uzbekistan, the action of religious public associations was allowed, which already directly interfered in the process of regulating public relations at the local level. Organizations such as Islom Lashkarlari (“Warriors of Islam”), “Tovba” and “Adolyat”, taking advantage of the moment, began to establish paramilitary units [14] to help local law enforcement agencies in the defense of public order. And they succeeded. These organizations began to enjoy authority not only among the local population, but also among the local authorities they helped. Turning into a real political force, these organizations were no longer satisfied with the role of "assistant", and they repeatedly attempted to take over the full power. There were cases when they openly sabotaged local authorities and demanded the transfer of all powers to them.

The “Birlik” Union, which took upon itself the task of spreading Pan-Turkic views, as well as the “Turkestan” movement, attempted to combine Pan-Turkism with Pan-Islamism. In a context where democratic avenues for pursuing political power were limited, the religious movement moved towards a path of extreme extremism. This trajectory was compounded by the publication in 1990 of the motto "Turkism is our body, Islam is our spirit" [15], which resonated with a combination of Pan-Turkism and Islamic identity. Pan-Turkism, an ideology fostering the unity of Turkic-speaking peoples, held particular significance in Uzbekistan due to its Turkic heritage. The concern of the authorities about potentially losing control over the narrative of national identity might explain why they refrained from using this motto [16].

Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, numerous Central Asian nations, Uzbekistan included, underwent significant political and societal transformations. Under the leadership of Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan took a firm stance against religious groups perceived as potential sources of opposition. This approach resulted in the closure of religious institutions and the suppression of certain religious leaders who were deemed to pose a challenge [17].

It can be argued that in the current situation, the opposition was crushed by Islam Karimov’s strong hand and could not speak openly and without fear.

Therefore, the so-called phrase “Islamic extremism” is most consonant with the concept of “political extremism”, and it has only an indirect connection with such a concept as “Islamic fundamentalism”. The main stereotype is the identification of Islamic fundamentalism with extremism [18]. And, in my opinion, it is fundamentally wrong to combine different conceptual definitions that carry a radically different meaning. Islam is only a cover for people who want to achieve power in any way, as it’s known, and it is generally impossible to involve religion into extremism without the violation of religious norms, but one can hide behind it.

The well-known Russian Islamic philosopher A. A. Ignatenko notes the incorrect use of the Western term “fundamentalism” to processes taking place in Sunni Islam: “That is an intellectual and political movement, to which external observers gave not quite the exact name fundamentalism, meaning returning under it to the fundamentals (foundation) of religion, Muslims themselves prefer to call ... ‘Salafism’ - from the expression of ‘As-Salaf As-Salih’ (righteous ancestors), or simply ‘As-Salaf’ (ancestors)". [19] Indeed, the Salafi phenomenon has deep sociocultural and religious roots proper. The authoritative domestic encyclopedic dictionary "Islam" defines Salafists as "the common name of religious Muslim leaders who, at various periods in the history of Islam, called for a focus on the lifestyle and faith of the early Muslim community", the righteous ancestors (“Al-Salaf al-Salihun”), qualifying as bid'a (unwarranted innovation) all the later innovations in these areas.

The activities of representatives of various Islamic foreign parties and organizations had the greatest success in Fergana also for other reasons. First of all, it should be noted that about half of the population of Uzbekistan lives in Fergana (more than 10 million inhabitants), in the most densely populated areas of the Fergana and Zarafshan valleys - 500–600 people per 1 square km [20]. And 60% of the population is younger than 25 years old, which dramatically increases the social and religious communication of people, and it is the main condition for the survival of the traditional way of life and the religious and communal mentality [21].

All these reasons brought the active Islamists to the vanguard, the main part of which, as it turned out, came from the families of Fergana.

Their first success was the change of leadership of the SADUM in 1989; The new mufti became a native of Andijan Muhammad Sodik Muhammad Yusuf. He immediately headed for the revival of Islam. For this, as Muhammad Sodik believed, it was necessary to restore at least the pre-revolutionary number of mosques and madras. Assuming control and pressure from local authorities, the new mufti tried to provide himself with a second source of legitimacy, putting forward his candidacy as a deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet and easily getting votes.

In short, the new mufti, skillfully and actively using both sources of the legitimacy of their status, for the period from 1989 to 1991 managed to achieve an increase in the number of mosques to 1.5 thousand (of which about 800 were in Fergana) [22]. After Uzbekistan gained sovereignty in 1991, Muhammad Sodik repeatedly spoke in favor of the gradual restoration of moral and ethical, and then legal Islamic norms. “Islam for a Muslim is a way of life that determines their social and personal relationships, their behavior in everyday life. Religion does not teach anything bad, does not in any way aim believers at disobedience to the authorities, but, on the contrary, helps the state to protect them” [23] – this is a quote from an interview with the mufti and the USSR people's deputy, given to them in 1991.

At the same time, being well aware of the claims of representatives of new radical Islamic groups from his native Fergana, and therefore, quite reasonably fearing a split among the Muslims of the republic, he urged to adhere to the Hanafi madhab [24], traditional for the majority of the local population.

Control over the Spiritual Administration fluctuated, and relations with governmental authorities did not improve for Sheikh Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusuf. Eventually, capitalizing on the increasing number of opponents against the mufti, in mid-December 1992, he was relieved of his position through an official state verdict (signed in January 1993). The entire staff of the Spiritual Administration was disbanded, and a significant portion of the archives was seized and confiscated. The former mufti left the country a few months later, initially relocating to Libya, and subsequently residing in Jeddah [25].

The problem was that the fragmented clergy, without their leader, weakened their positions and submitted to secular power, while the other, unofficial part began to preach radical and non-traditional Islam and was practically uncontrollable for the official authorities. Teaching religion in private is a criminal offense, and in official madrasahs, teachers carefully monitor that their pupils are loyal to the president. “Of course, we are interested in the student’s political views. At the entrance exam, we can ask the applicant the date of birth of the president or the words of the hymn. We believe that the imam should be first and foremost a patriot”, the head of the academic department of the largest in Central Asia Bukhara madrasa "Mir-Arab" Kobiljon Sodikov does not hide his ties with the authorities [26].

It is noteworthy that the vast majority of new Islamic groups and communities were founded in the cities of Fergana Valley. Such groups include, for example, Adolat, Islom lashkarlari, who are known for their extremely intolerant position on the existing order. To achieve their goals, the Islamists have begun to take active practical steps. In December 1991, Adolat organized mass rallies in Namangan city and secured the arrival of President Islam Karimov. The activists of the movement demanded the proclamation of Uzbekistan an Islamic republic, and Islam - the state religion, the legalization of opposition publications, the transfer of a number of administrative buildings in the center of Namangan to Islamic institutions.

After these events, the leadership of Uzbekistan realized that the religious movement in the Fergana Valley is turning into a strong and aggressive rival claiming supreme political power in the country. According to the Russian religious scholar A. Holmukhammedov, Islam Karimov fears the Fergana Valley, which is the most Islamized zone and where the most radical organizations are concentrated [27].

Now many researchers are trying to find the answer, why did Islam become the haven of extremism and terrorism in Central Asia and, in particular, in Uzbekistan. But trying to give an answer is difficult, since the processes that have taken place and are taking place in Uzbekistan are multidimensional and often poorly researched. The young state was faced with an avalanche of problems, both economic and social, and with the problem of the spiritual crisis of the population.

The people see that the Soviet government has collapsed (all those who stood at the helm of this government yesterday), give negative characteristics to it. Many people want to find an alternative to today's life in Islam. The new national governments have deceived the expectations, and democracy is perceived by the people through the prism of Western pop culture, permissiveness for officials and the rich, and the transformation of city streets into solid food markets, drug trafficking and prostitution markets. All attempts by politicians to create some kind of "ideology of justice and equality" fail because those who develop this ideology for the people live by completely different rules. The post-Soviet wave of modernization in Uzbekistan, rejecting the Soviet past and focused on the market and Western values, created an ideological vacuum that began to be filled with various religious teachings, and especially with Islam. Mosques began to be erected at an accelerated pace, Islamic universities opened, religious holidays appeared and no one has known parties and movements appeared too [28].

CONCLUSION

From the first days of independence, it became clear for the ruling elite of Uzbekistan that religion would by definition become one of the important but potentially volatile components of the emerging state ideology.

Uzbekistan's religious leaders also seek to define the role of religion in Uzbek society. Since their goal is spiritual, they set themselves more all-encompassing tasks than the state. The clergy accepted davat (missionary activity in Islam, literally - "call to faith") as the dominant of their religious responsibility.

The strengthening of the public political role of Islamic leaders is perceived as a threat not only by the state, but also by many members of the secular elite, who are concerned that the indirect link between morality and religion will lead to the fact that secular figures will lose leading social and economic positions. This creates a dilemma for the Uzbek authorities, who are afraid to use religious leaders to promote their ideas, while realizing that without the metered use of religious leaders, it is impossible to gain the loyalty of the population.

Throughout Uzbekistan's history, the coexistence between sultans and religious leaders was marked by intricate dynamics. To fortify their material position and bolster their political influence, the upper echelons of the clergy forged familial ties with khans and their inner circles. Gradually, they integrated into the structures of power, exerting control over domains such as law, education, and ideology. This interconnected relationship, while offering certain advantages, at times presented complexities for state policies.

Challenges within the societal and political landscape of the past were sometimes amplified by conflicts between different Khanates, resulting in episodes of conflict [29]. The absence of a robust central authority occasionally paved the way for regional separations and uncertainty. Governance primarily rooted in force, lacking in legal frameworks and social equity, unavoidably gave rise to critical situations [30].

The elevation of spiritual ideals, while significant, couldn't suffice for socioeconomic advancement. Material foundations, innovations, profound knowledge, and advanced technologies were requisite.

All in all before the 20^th century bearer’s of secular and religious roots of authority in general had a tendency of finding mutual understanding.

For this reason, Karimov’s regime has always sought to identify and then work with sympathetic clerics who the state believes will carry ideas that fully support the state. Such ideas should be based on Hanafi traditions, long popular in Central Asia, traditions that are generally associated with religious tolerance and the possibility for Muslim believers to submit to leaders from other religious backgrounds, provided that these leaders respect Islam.

State initiatives are also aimed at discrediting religious ideas that are considered dangerous. This is achieved through the control of licensing and accreditation of religious institutions and their Ministers, publication and distribution of religious literature, media content, honoring historical figures. The point is to fight the ideas of the so-called Wahhabis, who preach a politicized form of Islam, repeatedly emphasizing the importance of "Our (Uzbek) Islam", or using the slogans "Let's protect our religion!" (O'z dinimizni himoya qilamiz!), "Let's protect our religion from foreign forces!" (Dinimizni yot kuchlardan saqlaylik!) and "Let us never give up our sacred religion to anyone!" (Biz muqaddas dinimizni hech kimga bermaymiz!)". These slogans are used as rallying calls to foster a strong sense of religious identity and loyalty among the Uzbek population. They are part of the Uzbek government's efforts to counter what they perceive as dangerous religious ideas, particularly those associated with Wahhabism – an ideology they view as politicized and potentially destabilizing.

Through these slogans, the government aims to unite citizens in protecting their religious and cultural heritage. They emphasize preserving the nation's distinct religious identity against external influences that could weaken their faith.

The idea of the national uniqueness of the Uzbek version of Hanafi Islam is at odds with the global forces that independence has helped to stand on their feet. Uzbeks enjoy greater access to the Muslim world as a whole than ever under Soviet rule, as a result of direct ties between Uzbekistan and Muslim-majority States, both near and far. Turkey has been most decisive in establishing ties with Uzbekistan. Although Turkey was presented as an attractive model of a secular state under the leadership of President Turgut Ozal, a number of Islamic elements in Turkey, including Sufis, traditional Hanafi theologians, Islamists and representatives of the Tablighi movement, were represented in Uzbekistan. After independence, tens of thousands of Uzbeks performed the Hajj, partly at the expense of the Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabian Muslim philanthropic organizations (some with government support, some without) sent representatives to the region. Uzbeks were also invited to these countries. Uzbek theologians regularly receive (and accept) invitations to participate in international meetings, and students in madrassas have the opportunity to study in other Muslim countries.

Foreigners wishing to enter Uzbekistan, are currently subject to more careful control than in the early 1990s. But religious activists manage to enter the country, especially under the pretext of the real business interests. Uzbeks are now watching more closely than a few years ago the students who travel to study in seminaries outside Central Asia; in particular, the sources of their funding are being closely examined. Control over those who go to Hajj has also increased markedly since 2001, but those Uzbeks who fear that they may not have enough places in the official quota for Hajj from Uzbekistan can travel to Kyrgyzstan and travel with pilgrims from Kyrgyzstan.

Despite all these differences, among believers in our time there are the same differences as in the Soviet period. There is still tension between "popular Islam" (everyday rituals) and religious teachings, but in a different religious landscape, much more complex than in Soviet times, despite the constant presence of the state, which seeks to "guide" religion in the service of state goals.

To some extent, freed from the ideological social constraints of the Soviet era, Uzbekistan has become a more traditional society, and much more tied to its Muslim heritage than it was for much of the 20th century. But at the same time, Uzbekistan is a country living in the 21st century, and Uzbeks, regardless of their political ideology, are able, if they want, to establish ties with the world community through the Internet, television and radio, and traveling abroad. Establishing such ties can be costly, so the difference in economic opportunities plays a much more prominent role in Uzbekistan today than ever under Soviet rule.

How all this will develop in Uzbekistan after Islam Karimov is anyone's guess. Much will depend on the events of the final years of Karimov's rule, on whether statehood will be preserved in neighboring Kyrgyzstan, on peace and stability in Afghanistan, as well as on whether the economic opportunities for Uzbeks will meet their economic expectations.

* (Recognized as extremist in accordance with the legislation of the Russian federation - editor’s note) / (террористическая организация, деятельность которой запрещена в Российской федерации, прим. ред.)

References:

1. Spiritual administrations of Muslims – administrative bodies created by the Soviet authorities to exercise oversight and control over religious life in the Soviet republics and territories inhabited by Muslims. Spiritual administrations existed in the form of four separate bodies responsible for different territorial units: The Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the Spiritual Administration of Transcaucasia, the Spiritual Administration of the European Part of the USSR and Siberia, the Spiritual Administration of the North Caucasus and Dagestan.
2. Polyakov S.P. and Martha Brill Olcott, “Everyday Islam: Religion and Tradition in Rural Central Asia”/ Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1992 (In the book “Bytovoy Islam,” Polyakov describes Central Asian traditionalism as a dangerous ideology that “inhibits. . . economic and social development "by" preserving the "obsolete features" of eastern society "(p. 142). In particular, Polyakov blames Muslim traditionalism for confronting the modernization of the “old order” and upholding in the end an unstable and inefficient economic base - the “petty-bourgeois way”.)
3. Sheikh Muhammad Sodik Muhammad Yusuf (April 15, 1952, Andijan - March 10, 2015, Tashkent) - Soviet and Uzbek religious leader and theologian. Mufti and Chairman of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. People's Deputy of the USSR. Co-founder and member of the Council of Secretaries of the World Union of Muslim Ulema.
4. SADUM – Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan – the official organization of Muslims of the five Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union - the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek SSR. The headquarters of the organization was located in Tashkent.
5. Said Abdullo Nuri (1947–2006), a Tajik politician and religious leader of the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan* during the civil war in this country (1992–1997). He began his career as head of the illegal Islamic educational organization “Nakhzat-i Islomi” in the 1970s, Nuri was associated with the Party of the Islamic Renaissance of Tajikistan*, which sought to create an Islamic state in Tajikistan. After a peace agreement in 1997 that ended the civil war, he entered into a coalition with his former main opponent, President Emomali Rahmon (Rakhmonov), and was chairman of the Commission on National Reconciliation. //www.cr.org/ourwork/accord/tajikistan/profiles.php
6. Muhammadsharif Khimmatzoda (1951–2010) was an opposition leader and member of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) in exile during the civil war in Tajikistan, as well as a deputy chairman of the Islamic Revival Movement in Tajikistan. /Olimova S., Political Islam and Conflict in Tajikistan, - in "Political Islam and Conflict in Russia and Central Asia", ed. By Lena Jonson and Murad Esenov, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Stockholm, 1999, pp.124-134.
7. Sodikjon-Kori Kamalludin (Kamalov) (b. 1950), a prominent religious leader and former mufti of Osh, Kyrgyzstan. He was a deputy to the parliaments of Kyrgyzstan from 1990 to 1995, currently heads the International Center for Islamic Cooperation. / Urumbaev M., "Interview on the topic", "Tazar", June 20, 2007. www.tazar.kg/news.php?i=4893
8. Alexey Vsevolodovich Malashenko (February 2, 1951 – January 1, 2023, Moscow, USSR) - Soviet and Russian orientalist, Islamic scholar and political scientist. Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor. One of the leading Russian experts on Islam.
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** (Recognized as foreign agent in accordance with the legislation of the Russian federation - editor’s note) / (организация признана иностранным агентом в соответствии с законодательством Российской Федерации, прим. ред.)